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INFO LOG-22	ADS-22	AID-20	INR-25	SS-22	CIAE-20	NSCI-22
ARA-20	NSAE-22	COME-20	SSO-22	L-22	AMAD-21	TRSE-22
PM-25	PA-22	INRF-22	CA-22	A-22	USSS-22	FBIE-22
PAIM-21	DS-21	SLFD-21	DSE-22	/226 W		

-----275472 272233Z /38

P 271955Z FFF 86
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SICSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0565
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 USAF SO HOWARD AFB PN
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 USIA WASHDC 5263
 DPAHQ WASHDC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

OCT 3 1988

REVIEWED by Pugh DATE _____
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY in PART
 DENY Non-responsive info. *deleted*
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)
 TS authority to: _____
 CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

LIA WASHDC//AT-5/CS-1D/DI-6D2/JSI-4F/DI-3C1//
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 21 OF 23 LIMA 21449

TERRIP
 PANAMA FOR ADS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PIER, PHUM, PINS, ASFC, KPRP, PE
 SUBJECT: PERU: OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM DEVELOPMENTS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: PERU WITNESSED CONTINUED TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS DURING 1988. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDE INCREASED SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) ACTIVITY IN URBAN AREAS, ESPECIALLY LIMA, COMPLEMENTED BY RESURGENCE OF ATTACKS BY TUPAC AMARU REVOLUCIONARIO MOVEMENT (TARM)...

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 TUPAC AMARU REVOLUCIONARIO MOVEMENT (TARM); DECREASE IN SL INCIDENTS IN THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE, PARTICULARLY IN AYACUCHO CITY; AND APPARENT EXPANSION OF SL ACTIVITY SINCE NOVEMBER IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS NORTH OF LIMA. ALTHOUGH THREE YEARS OF MILITARY CONTROL HAS NOW MANAGED TO KEEP THE LID ON SL IN AYACUCHO, SL LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO HAVE SURVIVED, AND TERRORISTS RETAIN SIGNIFICANT

CAPACITY TO ATTACK IN CITIES AND IN RURAL AREAS OUTSIDE DIRECT MILITARY CONTROL. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON MILITARY EFFORTS:

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END SUMMARY

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3. PERU'S TWO TERRORIST GROUPS, THE FANATICAL MAOIST-INSPIRED SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) AND THE MORE TRADITIONAL CASERITH TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) CONTINUED VIOLENT ACTIVITIES DURING 1985. WE DISCERN SEVERAL IMPORTANT TRENDS IN TERRORIST SITUATION HERE, INCLUDING:

A. SL FOCUS ON URBAN AREAS: SL INCREASED ITS HIGH-PROFILE IN URBAN AREAS, PARTICULARLY LIMA. ACTIVITIES INCLUDED FLACKOUTS, BOMBINGS OF GOVERNMENT AND APRA PARTY OFFICES, AND SELECTED ASSASSINATIONS OF MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (INCLUDING THE FAILED ATTEMPT IN MAY TO KILL ELECTIONS BOARD HEAD GARCIA RADA, AND THE AUGUST KILLING OF PRISON CHIEF CASTRO). A HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT WAS THE INTRODUCTION IN JUNE BY SL OF CAR BOMBS, A TACTIC QUICKLY COPIED BY THE MRTA. POLICE OCCASIONALLY CAPTURE SL MEMBERS IN LIMA, BUT THE TERRORISTS' COMPARTMENTALIZED ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE, AND THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN CONTROLLING CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN A LARGE CITY, MAKE

DIFFICULT MAJOR INROADS AGAINST SL'S LIMA BRANCH. DURING 1985, SL CONTINUED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE ATTACKS AGAINST US3 PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS; WE EXPECT IT MAY WELL CONTINUE THESE EFFORTS IN 1986.

B. SL UNDER PRESSURE IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE: SL'S HOME TURF IS THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE (EZ), WHICH INCLUDES 15 PROVINCES IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF AYACUCHO, HUANCABELICA, AND APURIMAC. THE CONSENSUS AMONG PERUVIAN OFFICIALS AND OBSERVERS IS THAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THREE YEARS OF MILITARY CONTROL OF THE AYACUCHO EZ HAS WEAKENED SL THERE AND HAS REDUCED ITS ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA. ALTHOUGH STATISTICS ARE GENERALLY UNAVAILABLE, WE CONCUR THAT THE MILITARY IS NOW KEEPING A LID ON SL IN THE EZ, PARTICULARLY IN THE CITY OF AYACUCHO AND NEARBY AREAS. NEVERTHELESS, SL MAY BE DOWN BUT IT IS NOT OUT. REPORTS CONTINUE TO SURFACE OF SL ATTACKS AGAINST RECALCITRANT PEASANTS, ASSASSINATIONS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS, AND HOLDUPS OF TRAVELLERS ON ISOLATED STRETCHES OF MAIN ACCESS HIGHWAYS. MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS TOLD POLOFF RECENTLY IN AYACUCHO THAT SL APPEARED LESS WILLING TO CHALLENGE LARGE NUMBERS OF SECURITY FORCES, CHOOSING INSTEAD TO AMBLUSH SMALLER

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PAIRS. THEY ALSO ADMITTED THAT NOTWITHSTANDING
REDUCED SI ACTIVITIES, SI PROBABLY MAINTAINED GOOD
INTELLIGENCE AND ORGANIZATION THROUGHOUT ITS TRADITIONAL
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	ARA-22	NSAE-22	COME-22	SSO-22	L-22	AMAD-01	TRSF-22
	PM-25	PA-02	INRE-02	CA-22	A-22	USSS-22	FFIF-22
	FAIM-21	DS-01	SLPD-21	DSF-22	/226 W		

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F 271955Z FEB 83
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0626
 INIC AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 USAF SO HOWARD AFB IN
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS FM
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 USIA WASHDC 5264
 DEARQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC//AT-5/CS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1//
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 22 OF 23 LIMA 21449
 TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINS, ASEC, KFRF, PE
 SUBJECT: PERU: OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM DEVELOPMENTS
 AREAS IN THE EZ, INCLUDING THE CITY OF AYACUCHO. THESE
 OFFICIALS ALSO BELIEVED THAT LIFTING OF THE STATE OF
 EMERGENCY IN THESE AREAS AND ENDING OF MILITARY CONTROL
 WOULD RESULT IN RESUMPTION OF SL ATTACKS. HOWEVER,
 OFFICIALS ALSO POINTED TO THE "DEFECTION" OF 200
 PEASANTS WHO HAD LIVED IN SL AREAS AS EVIDENCE THAT
 SL "SUPPORT" WAS OFTEN RESULT OF FEAR RATHER THAN

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CONVICTION AMONG CAMPESINOS.

- C. SL MOVES NORTH: IN ADDITION TO ITS BASES IN
 AYACUCHO AND IN URBAN LIMA, SL HAS CARRIED OUT
 ACTIVITIES AT VARYING LEVELS IN MOST OF PERU'S 23
 CIBER DEPARTMENTS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE APPEAR
 TO BE CENTRAL LA LIBERTAD DEPARTMENT AND WESTERN

HUANUCO DEPARTMENT, BOTH ISOLATED MOUNTAINOUS AREAS;
 FOUR PROVINCES IN THE LATTER ARE UNDER STATE OF
 EMERGENCY DECREE. BY JANUARY 1983, THERE APPEARED TO
 BE A PATTERN OF INCREASED SL ATTACKS CENTERED AROUND
 WESTERN HUANUCO, EXTENDING INTO THE NEIGHBORING
 MOUNTAINS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ANCASH, LIMA AND
 PASCO (PASCO ALSO INTERESTS SL BECAUSE OF THE DYNAMITE

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AVAILABLE AT ITS NUMEROUS MILITARY AND OTHER LOCAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT PRESSURE ON SL IN THE AYACUCHO EZ HAS INDUCED SL TO SHIFT SOME RURAL OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE; SOME HAVE LINKED THE PHENOMENON TO MAO'S "LONG MARCH." LIKE AYACUCHO, THE HUANUCO-ANCASH-PASCO AREA IS ISOLATED, POOR, AND HAS RUGGED TERRAIN; UNLIKE THE EZ, IT LIES OUTSIDE THE CURRENT AREA OF MILITARY CONTROL. SL ACTIONS HERE SO FAR REPORTEDLY INCLUDE THE ASSASSINATION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS, POLICE, AND A TEACHER, AS WELL AS FOUR PEASANTS. EMPASSY BELIEVES SL PROBABLY HAS INITIATED AN INCREASE IN ACTIVITIES NORTH OF LIMA THAT COULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOV TO CONTROL WITHOUT MILITARY RESOURCES. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THAT SL HAS DECIDED TO INITIATE STRATEGIC RETREAT FROM AYACUCHO. SL WORKED WITH PEASANTS IN AYACUCHO FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS BEFORE BEGINNING ARMED ATTACKS; IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON COMPARABLE SUPPORT AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN OTHER AREAS.

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	ARA-22	NSAE-22	COME-22	SSO-22	L-22	AMAD-21	TRSH-22
	FM-25	PA-22	INRF-22	CA-22	A-22	USSS-22	FBIE-22
	FAIM-21	DS-21	SLID-21	DSE-22	/026 W		

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F 271955Z FEB 86
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0567
 INFO AMEMBASSY FOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 USAFSD HOWARD AFB PN
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 USIA WASHDC 5265
 DEAFQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC//AT-5/OS-1D/TF-6D2/JSI-4E/DE-3C1//
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 23 LIMA 21449
 TERREP
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 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, PE
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4. FOREIGN SUPPORT: ASSERTIONS THAT PERUVIAN TERRORISTS
 RECEIVE FOREIGN SUPPORT FREQUENTLY SURFACE IN THE

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LOCAL PRESS. SO FAR, WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY HARD
 EVIDENCE THAT WOULD SUPPORT SUCH ASSERTIONS. ON THE
 CONTRARY, SL'S APPARENT RELIANCE ON LOCAL SOURCES
 FOR WEAPONS, AND ITS INTENSE DOGMATISM ARGUE AGAINST
 SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN TIES. LOCAL PRESS HAS REPORTED,
 HOWEVER, SL'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL
 REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRI), A GROUP OF EXTREMIST

MAOIST PARTIES, AND GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO PRO-SL
 PROPAGANDIZING IN FRANCE AND THE U.S. THE MRI WOULD
 BE A MORE LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR FOREIGN SUPPORT BECAUSE
 OF ITS LESS IMBEXIBLE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION, ITS
 EXPERIENCE IN NICARAGUA OF ONE OF ITS FORMER LEADERS,
 AND ITS APPARENT SYMPATHIES FOR THE M-19. NEVERTHELESS,
 FIRM EVIDENCE IS LACKING.

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3. PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: PRESIDENT GARCIA THUS FAR HAS CONTINUED TO RELY UPON A STRONG MILITARY COMPONENT IN HIS COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGY, AS REFLECTED BY THE PERIODIC RENEWAL OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY DECREES THAT ESTABLISH MILITARY CONTROL IN SELECTED PROVINCES. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIANS APPEAR AWARE THAT THEY NEED TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL PROGRAMS IN THE TERRORISTS' RURAL BASES AS WELL. THUS FAR, THE REALITIES OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET (WHICH COVERED CY 85) AND [] HAVE RULED OUT LARGE SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY HAS PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO A FEW COMMUNITIES IN AYACUCHO. THE GOV HAS ALSO REDUCED THE AREA UNDER MILITARY CONTROL FROM 26 TO 19 PROVINCES, IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE PROGRESS AGAINST SL AND TO RESTORE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, SL CARRIED OUT IMPORTANT ATTACKS IN JANUARY, 1988 IN TWO OF THE

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PROVINCES WHERE MILITARY CONTROL WAS LIFTED, SUGGESTING THAT FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE WOULD BE PREMATURE. AT SAME TIME,

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[] BOTH SL AND MRTA HAVE PROVEN THEY CAN ATTACK ALMOST AT WILL IN LIMA. IF TERRORIST ACTIVITY INTENSIFIES STILL FURTHER IN CAPITAL, PUBLIC PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT TO DO SOMETHING EFFECTIVE TO COPE WITH SITUATION WILL GROW. JORDAN
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